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Abstract 
Throughout history there have been a number of professional sports teams that have been 
publicly traded.  Many fans and followers of sports may jump at these opportunities to own a 
part of their favorite teams.  This paper analyzes stock performance of past and current publicly 
traded teams to determine whether these stocks constitute a sound financial investment or only 
derive their value from the sentimental value stockholders place on the ownership.  Monthly and 
yearly stock returns of both American and European companies were compiled, analyzed, and 
compared to popular stock market indexes.  Much of the analysis was done using Microsoft 
excel regression, correlation, and descriptive statistics functions.  Our findings indicate stocks of 
publicly traded professional sports teams show that they can provide some investment value for 
investors, although not all of them can be recommended as a sound financial investment.  Value 
is contributed by the way of high returns in some periods and significant portfolio diversification 
benefits.  Since stocks of publicly traded professional sports teams have shown the ability to 
provide investors with value, future opportunities may merit serious consideration when they 
become available. 
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I. Introduction 
An initial public offering (IPO) is defined as the first sale of stock by a private company 
to the public ("Initial public offering," 2010).  Businesses primarily initiate an IPO to generate 
capital in order to fund their operations and growth.  Professional sports teams throughout the 
world are no different.  Several teams have used IPO’s in the past but there are currently no 
American professional sports teams that are publicly traded.  Since the late 1990’s there have 
been several cases of professional sport franchises issuing initial public offerings (IPOs) to the 
general public.  The issuances of such IPOs have been carried out in a variety of ways:  Publicly 
traded teams, general corporate ownership, and community-based ownership.  It is important to 
determine whether transitioning from being a private to public company would be beneficial to 
owners of the team and/or investors.  This paper will look at past cases of professional sports 
teams initiating an IPO; determine how much capital was raised and whether the process was 
worthwhile for owners and investors.  Also, in order to determine if purchasing stock in a 
professional sports team would be beneficial, this paper will use stock returns of previous cases 
to analyze the performance of the stock and the potential diversification benefit of including a 
professional sports stock in investor portfolios.   
 
II. Advantages and Disadvantages of Initial Public Offerings 
a. Owners.   
Advantages.   
An initial public offering can be a great way for an owner to raise large amounts of 
capital that can be valuable for several reasons. 
2 
 
 Stadium construction/renovation.  It has become commonplace in professional sports for 
teams to build the most up to date, state of the art facilities as possible.  These stadiums can be 
extremely pricey and cost upwards of a billion dollars.  For example, according to Forbes.com 
Madison Square Garden and the new Yankee Stadium cost $1.1 and $1.3 billion respectively 
(Egan, 2008).  This is an incredible amount of money that may not be able to be funded solely by 
private owners.  Offering stock to the public could be a great way to hedge these huge costs and 
make the construction or renovation of a facility possible.  In the past it was common practice for 
a city or municipality to either pay some or all of these costs in order to keep their team in town 
(Keating, 1999).  For example, during the twentieth century $15 billion came directly from local 
governments to subsidize sports facilities (Keating, 1999).  However, recently there has been a 
sharp decline in these subsidies.  Tax payers are becoming reluctant to increase their taxes in 
order to help a rich individual build a stadium for their team (Kane, 1999). 
 Players.  The idea of selling stock to the public in order to fund the purchase of free 
agents and players has been used by British soccer teams (Smith, 2003).  Top caliber players can 
be very expensive and this can be an effective way to make such purchases possible, especially 
for smaller market teams.  In 2010, according to Forbes.com, the top three revenue generating 
teams in Major League Baseball (New York Yankees, New York Mets, Boston Red Sox) 
average $325 million in revenues while the bottom three (Oakland Athletics, Pittsburgh Pirates, 
Florida Marlins) average $148 million.  Likewise, in the NFL, the top three teams in terms of 
revenue (Dallas Cowboys, Washington Redskins, and New England Patriots) averaged $364 
million while the last three (Jacksonville Jaguars, Oakland Raiders, Detroit Lions) average $216 
million.  As seen here, there is a difference of over $100 million in revenues between the big 
market and small market teams in these professional leagues.  In 2007, Alex Rodriguez signed a 
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10 year contract with the New York Yankees worth $275 million according to espn.com 
("Rodriguez finalizes $275m," 2007).  In 2008, CC Sabathia signed a 7 year $161 million 
contract with the New York Yankees, according to NBCsports.com ("Lefty ex-cy young," 2008).  
Since small market teams cannot generate the same of revenues as the larger market teams, it 
puts them at a disadvantage when it comes to signing expensive free agents such as Rodriguez 
and Sabathia.  However, if small market teams used an IPO to increase their capital and cash 
available, they may be able to make a run at some of these free agents and improve their team’s 
chances of winning.        
 Liquidation.  Professional sport franchises can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, 
making them very difficult to change hands.  What does a private owner do when they are 
looking to sell their team but cannot find a buyer right away?  One solution to this problem 
would be the sale of an IPO in order to liquidate some of their investment in the meantime 
without giving up their control of the team.  In this case, the money received from the sale of 
stock is referred to as “early money” (Schaffer, 2006).  By selling some of the team to the public, 
owners receive a large lump sum of money right now, but earn less when the team is sold 
outright because shareholders need to be compensated as well.  This technique of an owner 
cashing in on their investment before they are able to sell the team to another private investor has 
little downside and great advantages.   
 Increase brand loyalty.  Furthermore, the sale of stock to the general public presents the 
opportunity for a sport franchise to increase its loyal fan base (Schaffer, 2006).  This brand 
loyalty can be beneficial to the owner in the form of increased merchandise purchases, website 
visits, season ticket sales, and revenue in general.  Parents and grandparents may purchase stock 
as gifts for kids, which in turn could start them young and make them fans for life (Schaffer, 
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2006).  This increased revenue is not enough for an owner to offer an IPO in itself; however, it 
could be a contributing factor in the decision process (Schaffer, 2006).     
 Disadvantages.  Although a very large amount of capital can be raised from initiating an 
IPO, there are many challenges and costs associated with going public as well. 
 League Opposition.  The policies on going public are different depending on which 
professional league a particular team operates in.  In the NHL, league officials review proposals 
regarding the sale of stock and have generally been compliant as long as one shareholder 
maintains majority control at all times (Schaffer, 2006).  In 1997 Major League Baseball 
franchise owners voted to allow the sale of stock once registered with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission ("baseball owners ok," 1997).  Like the NHL, and MLB owner that 
initiates an IPO must maintain majority control over the team at all times, meaning that they can 
sell up to 49% of the team.  The NFL, however, is a different story.  The NFL constitution 
prohibits corporate ownership within its league and all transfer of ownership among private 
parties must be approved by 75% of the current owners (Schaffer, 2006).  With this said, there is 
some controversy over whether or not this NFL rule would stand against a law suit under the  
Sherman Anti-Trust Act if an owner chose to do so.  The problem is, however, law suits can be 
costly, time consuming, and owners will have to take a close look at if they want to try and sue 
an organization that they are actually a part of.  This could create tremendous resentment by 
other owners throughout the league.  
 Costs.  A very valid criticism against a professional sport franchise selling stock to the 
public is the cost it would take to actually carry out the IPO and maintain the team as a public 
corporation.  One study states that, in general, the costs of carrying out an IPO will cost around 
15% or more of the capital actually generated (Kratofil, 1999).  15% is a very large sum of 
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money when you consider the amount of capital that is being raised.  For example, in the case of 
the Cleveland Indians IPO, the owner raised $60 million from the sale but had expenses of $6.2 
million in the process (Kadlec, 1998).  This is not quite 15% that was mentioned earlier; 
however, this $6.2 million in expenses is money that owner, Richard Jacobs, will lose on the 
value of his franchise.  He collected $53.8 million in “early money,” but lost $6.2 million on the 
expenses that he would have collected in the final sale of the team to a private investor in 2000, 
had he not gone public.   
 Most of the expenses of initiating an IPO are attributed to the investment bankers who are 
responsible for actually pricing, marketing, and selling the securities to the general public 
(Schneider, Manko, & Kant, 1981).  Also expensive are the attorneys necessary to create filings 
for the Securities and Exchange Commission and handle various legal issues throughout the 
process.  In addition, certified accountants are needed to prepare financial statements that are 
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Schneider, Manko, & Kant, 1981).  This 
is not a onetime expense, accountants and attorneys will be needed on staff permanently in order 
to prepare and maintain these filings and statements each year in order to comply with SEC 
regulations.  Aside from the many monetary costs, there will also be many opportunity cost 
incurred throughout the process.  An example of this is the time commitment that key personnel 
of the organization will have to attribute to the sale of stock (Schaffer, 2006).  Executives will 
need to spend much time meeting with lawyers, accountants, and financial advisors throughout 
the process; taking them away from their normal day-to-day responsibilities.  The process of 
going public is not a short one; it takes at least three months and can even exceeds six months 
(Schneider, Manko, & Kant, 1981).  This could hurt the short term operations of the organization 
and put them at a competitive disadvantage during this duration of time (Schaffer, 2006).  The 
6 
 
management of the organization prior to the sale of an IPO often has to go on “road shows” in 
order to promote the sale and gain awareness (Cheffins, 1999).  This, again, occupies key 
personnel and can have negative effects of short term operations and efficiency.   
 As mentioned earlier, the costs of going public do not end once the sale of the IPO is 
complete.  In addition to the cost of lawyers and accountants to prepare documents for the SEC 
on a regular basis, there will be costs to prepare annual shareholder meetings, distribute materials 
to shareholders, and maintaining a registry of shareholders (Schaffer, 2006).  These may sound 
simple and insignificant but the nature of sports stock in the past makes them expensive and hard 
to deal with.  For example, in the case of the Boston Celtics, they had 90% of shareholders 
owning 10 shares or less (Lebowitz, 1996).  This greatly increased the size and cost of 
shareholder meetings, paperwork that needed to be distributed, and made the job of maintaining 
a shareholder registry extremely difficult (Lebowitz, 1996). 
 Disclosure.  In the event of going public, the owner of the professional sport franchise 
would be required, by the SEC, to make all of their financial operations public.  We live in an 
age where every action, or non-action, of a professional sports team is highly publicized and 
criticized by the media (Schaffer, 2006).  All of this newly public information would give sports 
journalist and talk show hosts an opportunity for more criticism and negative press toward that 
franchise.  Also, by making the team’s profits public, the owner may hurt themselves in regards 
to negotiations of player’s contracts and city subsidies for stadium construction (Schaffer, 2006).  
Player’s agents and cities will be able to see exactly how much money the team is actually 
making instead of simply having to rely on the owner’s word or estimated figures.        
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Owners have the ability to raise incredible amounts of capital in the process of selling 
stock to the public, but they need to carefully weigh the benefits of this decision against both the 
monetary and opportunity costs that will be incurred from the sale.   
 Investors.  An initial sale of a stock by a sports company requires two parties; there 
needs to be a team offering the sale and individuals willing to purchase shares.  Without proper 
demand for stock being sold, the sale will be a failure and no real capital will be raised.  Past 
IPO’s by professional sports teams have primarily been purchased by fans of that particular team 
(Schaffer, 2006).   
 Advantages.  The nature of past sports stock IPO’s have made the advantages of owning 
shares in the team psychological rather than monetary or tangible (Schaffer, 2006).  The primary 
advantage is the sense of pride that one will gain in owning a piece of their favorite professional 
sport franchise.  It is no secret that sports teams can mean a lot to the fans in their community, 
and having the opportunity to own a part of that team is something fans have taken advantage of 
when available.  Fans hold sentimental value in their ownership and have been documented to 
have bought stock as gifts and pass down shares as a family heirloom.   
 An important tangible benefit of owning shares of stock in a professional sport franchise 
is the opportunity to attend annual shareholder meetings (Schaffer, 2006).  For example, the 
2005 Green Bay Packers shareholders meeting drew a crowd of 9,700 people and a shareholders-
only practice the day before attracted over 14,000 viewers (Fedotin, 2005).  As seen here, 
shareholders seem to enjoy the opportunity to attend special events that put them closer to the 
team.   
 Disadvantages.  The primary and most common argument brought up in the opposition 
of owning stock in a professional sport franchise is the idea that it is a bad financial investment 
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(Cheffins, 1999).  When teams offer an IPO, such as the Cleveland Indians and Florida Panthers, 
the owners make it clear to the public that they have no intention of paying dividends on the 
stock (Lascari, 1999).  The Boston Celtics did pay dividends in their first couple years of being 
public but the returns were nothing extraordinary by any means (Krupa, 1998).  Some say that 
the best opportunity for a shareholder to realize a return on their purchase of stock in when the 
team is actually sold and they earn capital gains.  This was the case with the Cleveland Indians 
when the team was sold and shareholders received a 50.7% return over the two years (Lubinger, 
2000).  Generally, however, those who purchase stock in a professional sports team do not 
expect nor actually realize any monetary return on their investment.  As the analysis in this paper 
suggest, there may be diversification benefits for an investor as well. 
Also, due to league rules that require one individual maintain majority control, 
shareholders do not gain anything in regards to voting rights in the team’s operation s (Schaffer, 
2006).  Shareholders technically are awarded a vote in the operations but the owner’s vote is 
worth more than every other shareholder’s combined.   
Furthermore, shareholders do not receive any additional perks for being an owner.  
Historically, there has been no free merchandise or tickets, opportunity to meet the staff, or 
priority purchasing for playoff tickets.   
 
III. Types of Public Ownership 
Since the late 1990’s there have been several cases of professional sport franchises 
issuing initial public offerings (IPOs) to the general public.  The issuances of such IPOs have 
been carried out in a variety of ways:  Stock market teams, general corporate ownership, and 
community-based ownership. 
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a. General corporate ownership.   
It has become commonplace for public corporations to purchase sports franchises in the 
NBA, MLB, and NHL.  In this case, the sports teams are just a fraction of the corporations 
overall operations.  Purchasing stock in one of these corporations would not assure an investor 
that any of their money will go toward improving the sports team that they own.  A fan looking 
to invest in or support a specific team would not necessarily do so under this ownership style.  
Examples of general corporate ownership are as follows: 
 
 Comcast Corporation.  Comcast Corporation is a provider of cable, entertainment and 
communication products and services which owns such companies as:  E! Entertainment 
Television, Versus, Golf Channel, G4, and Style Network among others ("Comcast cable 
networks," 2010).  In 1996 they purchased the Philadelphia 76ers and Philadelphia Flyers to add 
to this list ("Corporate overview," 2010). 
 Cablevision System Corporation.  Cablevision system is a telecommunications, media 
and entertainment company which owns and operates Madison Square Garden, Inc along with 
companies such as AMC, IFC Entertainment, Rainbow Media Holdings, and News 12 Network 
among many others ("About cablevision," 2010).  Madison Square Garden, Inc., which is traded 
on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol MSG, has a portfolio of investments that includes three 
segments:  MSG Media, MSG Sports, and MSG Entertainment.  In 1997, the company purchased 
the New York Knicks and New York Rangers to add to their MSG Sports segment.  Therefore, 
because these two teams are such a small portion of Madison Square Garden, Inc’s entire 
business, owning MSG stock would not directly contribute to the operations of these teams. 
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b. Community-based ownership.   
This ownership style takes place when non-marketable securities are sold to the public 
and the community owns the majority of the shares ("2010 shareholders meeting," 2010).  The 
term non-marketable securities means that the shares cannot be traded and owners are not 
allowed to make a profit from them.   
 
 Green Bay Packers.  The Green Bay Packers very unique in that they are the only 
American professional sport franchise to be owned by individual shareholders.  Since 1923 they 
have been a publicly owned, non-profit organization that is now owned by 112,158 stockholders 
holding a total of 4,750,937 shares ("2010 shareholders meeting," 2010).  Stockholders do not 
receive any dividends or preferential treatment for their ownership and support of the team.  
Stockholders do have the right to vote for the members of the board of directors which in turn 
elects a seven member executive committee.  Individual shares can only be accumulated by 
purchasing them during an IPO or in the case of inheriting shares from a death in one’s 
immediate family.  Throughout their history, the Green Bay Packers have carried out four stock 
sales:  1923, 1935, 1950, and 1997.  The most recent sale was of roughly 120,000 shares at $200 
per share, raising over $24 million for the team.  This large influx of capital ensured that the 
team would stay afloat for the next 25 years.  Although they generated such a large amount of 
capital, it is not as much as they would have hoped; the team had planned on selling 400,000 
shares.  The fact that they could not even sell half the amount that they wanted shows that it is 
possible to saturate the market of fans willing to spend money to support their team. 
 
 
 
11 
 
c. Publicly traded teams.   
A stock market team is one in which the revenue and profits generated by that team are 
the primary source of revenue for the corporation that owns that team.  These corporations issue 
marketable securities to the public, in the form of an IPO, which are then traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ) or other stock market.  Three teams that can be classified as publicly 
traded teams are the Boston Celtics of the National Basketball Association (NBA), the Cleveland 
Indians of Major League Baseball (MLB), and the Florida Panthers of the National Hockey 
League (NHL) (Cheffins, 1999). 
  
 Boston Celtics.  The Boston Celtics carried out a public offering in 1986 in which forty 
percent of the team was put up for sale to the public by its three general partners:  Don Gaston, 
Alan Cohen and Paul Dupee. Investors purchased the shares in the master limited partnership at 
an IPO price of $17.50 per share on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the ticker 
symbol BOS (Bailey, 1989).  In 1998, following the expiration of the tax advantages available to 
the master limited partnership, the Celtics partnership was reorganized into two entities: a public 
limited partnership, taxable as a corporation; and a private limited partnership. Units of the new 
public partnership continue to be listed for trading on the NYSE until 2002 when the team was 
fully purchased by private investors (Krupa, 1998). 
 
 Cleveland Indians. In 1998, Owner of the Cleveland Indians, Richard E. Jacobs, sold 
four million shares of stock at $15 each to raise $60 million (Kadlec, 1998).  Jacobs retained all 
voting rights for the team and offered no benefits in regards to dividends or preferential ticket 
treatment.  The company did not plan to pay any dividends or compensate shareholders in any 
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similar manner.  The team was then sold in 2000 for $320 million and resulted in all of the shares 
of stock being bought back for $22.61 per share (Lubinger, 2000) (proxy statement). 
 
 Florida Panthers.  In 1996 Florida Panthers Holding Inc. carried out an IPO that 
constituted nearly 6 million shares and 49% ownership of the franchise.  (Lascari, 1999).  The 
price of the IPO fluctuated between $10 and $12 dollars per share on NASDAQ under the ticker 
symbol PUCK and generated $67.3 million (Golden Panthers).  To owner Wayne Huizenga, a 
man who built Waste Management Inc. and Blockbuster video into billion-dollar ventures, $67.3 
million was a large amount of capital considering that the team was valued at $45 million by 
Financial World magazine only 6 months earlier (Golden Panthers).  The IPO was structured in 
such a way that investors were required to purchase a minimum of 100 shares of the Class A 
Common Stock and could not purchase more than 1,000 shares.   
 In the summer of 1997, Huizenga instituted another IPO of Class A Common Stock; 
however, this time the shares were to be traded on the NYSE under the ticker symbol PAW. 
However, soon after their IPO Florida Panthers Holding Inc. began purchasing hotels and resorts 
and moved from being a stock market team to more of a general corporate ownership style.   
 There are various structures of publicly traded professional sports franchises and each has 
its own benefits and drawbacks to owners and investors.  Each individual case needs to be 
analyzed on its own in order to accurately determine its potential value to an owner or an 
investor. 
 
IV. European Public Ownership 
The idea of operating a professional sports team as a publicly traded corporation is by no 
means isolated to the United States.  Throughout history there have been many soccer clubs that 
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have raised capital through an IPO and have had their stock traded on a securities exchange; even 
the famed Red Devils of Manchester United and Gunners of Arsenal have operated this way.  
Teams in the FA Premier League, which is a league of the top 20 teams in England such as 
Manchester United and Arsenal, have traditionally been owned by very wealthy individuals as a 
sense of civic pride rather than financial investment.  It was seen as a game for the working class 
fan, represented through inexpensive ticket prices, who tied fandom with their personal identity.  
Owners did not expect to experience investment gains from their teams but rather used the soccer 
club to promote themselves and other organizations that they were associated with (Nauright and 
Ramfjord, 2010).   
Recently, however, there has been a movement towards commercialization within the 
European leagues as owners see investment opportunities.  Such opportunities in this industry 
can exist in the forms of incredible media and television contracts, increased ticket prices, 
concession sales, and luxury seating.  Included in this commercialization is a movement by 
foreign owners, particularly Americans, to take European teams private and abandon their 
standing as publicly traded corporations.  Football clubs that have been taken private by 
American owners include: Manchester United by Malcolm Glazer (also owns the Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers of the NFL), Aston Villa by Randy Lerner (also owns the Cleveland Browns of the 
NFL), Liverpool by Tom Hicks (also owns the Texas Rangers and Dallas Stars) and George 
Gillett.  Additionally, Stan Kroenke (also owns the Denver Nuggets of the NBA, Colorado 
Avalanche of the NHL, and US soccer team Colorado Rapids, among other things) has been 
building up a stake in already privately held Arsenal.   
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V. Dead Companies 
This section will look into the performance of stock for companies that were at one time 
publicly traded, but have since become privately owned.  Financial terminology for such 
companies is “dead companies” which includes companies that were taken private or have filed 
for bankruptcy.  Some of these companies have been mentioned already in this paper (Boston 
Celtics, Florida Panthers, and Cleveland Indians), while a few are new to this discussion 
(Manchester United and Aston Villa).  Historical stock returns will be examined and compared 
to market indexes, using regression and correlation analysis, to determine the investment 
performance of the stock in relation to the market.  This will help determine whether or not any 
of these companies would have been a viable investment during the time they were publicly 
traded.  This will provide insight into whether stocks of publicly traded sports teams, in general, 
can constitute a good investment. 
a. Boston Celtics Limited Partnership   
Stock for the Boston Celtics Limited Partnership tipped off its trading on the New York 
Stock Exchange, under the ticker symbol BOS, in the final months of 1986.  Throughout its time 
being publicly traded, from December 31, 1986 to December 31, 2002, BOS had experienced an 
average annual capital gain of 9.81% (Table 1.0).  The company, unlike many publicly traded 
professional sports teams, paid out dividends to its shareholders on a regular basis.  From 1986 to 
year end 2002, BOS paid out an average annual dividend of $1.18 to shareholders.  When 
dividend income is taken into account, total annual return of Boston Celtics stock over that 
period increases to 16.44% and a standard deviation of 42.65%.  When compared to the average 
yearly return of the S&P 500, a stock market index of 500 large-cap common stocks actively 
traded in the United States, over the same period of 9.67%, BOS provided a significantly higher 
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return.  Comparing stock performance to the S&P 500 is useful because it is a stock market index 
of 500 large company common stocks actively traded in the United States, is one of the most 
widely used investment benchmarks for the US stock market, and shows the general movement 
of the market as a whole.  This comparison shows that while it was being traded, BOS gave 
investors the opportunity to realize significant gains, outpacing the market by nearly 7%.  A 
large portion of the high returns for BOS can be attributed to an incredible jump in the stock’s 
price in anticipation of its privatization.  This event officially occurred on April 30, 2003, when 
the company’s shares were purchased from stockholders for $27 per share.   
Typically, the reward of common stocks having the potential to realize abnormally high 
returns relative to the market does not come without risk.  This risk is primarily measured by the 
beta of a stock which measures the volatility of the stocks returns in relation to the market.  The 
beta of a stock is usually listed on a stock’s quote summary; however, since the companies 
discussed here are no longer publicly traded, this information is not available.  In order to 
compute a value for the stock’s beta, a simple regression analysis can be used.  When comparing 
the monthly returns of the Boston Celtics’ stock, from December 31, 1986 to December 31, 
2002, to the monthly returns of the S&P 500 over the same period, using an OLS regression 
analysis, the x-variable coefficient (beta) of BOS was estimated at 0.15.  This is extremely low 
and suggests that the stock is a very stable, safe investment even though it has provided average 
yearly returns that outpace the market by a significant margin.  This value, however, should be 
given little consideration given the fact that the r squared value of the regression analysis is a 
mere 0.62%.  The r squared value is used to show how much of the variability in the y variable 
(BOS) is explained by the change in the x variable (S&P 500).  A significant r squared is 
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normally in the range of 75-100%; thus a value of .62% shows that the beta number configured 
in the analysis has very little relevance.   
Boston Celtics’ stock had a high average annual return in comparison to the S&P 500; 
however, it appears that this was a result of the risk associated with the stock and not risks 
related to market factors.  This is shown by using the Sharpe ratio, which is calculated by taking 
the average annual return minus the risk free rate, divided by the standard deviation.  A higher 
Sharpe ratio number is considered better because it shows that the stock experienced higher 
return for its level of risk, as measured by the stock’s standard deviation.  A lower Sharpe ratio 
would show that the stock does not yield much return compared to the riskiness of the stock.  
Boston Celtics’ Sharpe ratio was 0.27 while the S&P 500’s was 0.3.  This shows that relative to 
the amount of risk that was associated with each, as measured by standard deviation, the S&P 
500 outperformed BOS on a risk-adjusted basis.  Although the Boston Celtics’ stock had returns 
that were significantly greater than that of the S&P 500, when the total risk is taken into account, 
it does not appear as attractive of an investment.   
Another value that needs to be considered is the correlation coefficient of the stock’s 
returns in relation to the market.  This is, again, done using the S&P 500 as a benchmark and 
measures the relationship between the movements in the two variables.  The correlation 
coefficient ranges from +1 (perfectly correlated) to -1 (perfectly uncorrelated).  A correlation 
coefficient of 0 shows that there is absolutely no relationship between movement in the stock’s 
price and movement in the market index.  Boston Celtics’ stock delivered a correlation 
coefficient of .07 in relation to the S&P 500 stock index.  This number is very close to 0, 
indicating that there is very little relationship between the two.  Having a very low, or even 
negatively, correlated stock can be very helpful to an investor when considering portfolio 
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management, due to the concept of diversification.  This concept revolves around the idea of 
assembling a group of negatively or uncorrelated investments that will mitigate risk without a 
corresponding sacrifice of expected return.  One wants to group stocks that perform differently in 
relation to one another as to offset any outrageous declines with abnormal gains.  The fact that 
Boston Celtics’ stock had a low correlation coefficient made it a n attractive option for 
diversification purposes because it was little affected by changes in the market as a whole. 
There seems to have been some real value in using the Boston Celtics’ stock as an 
investment while it was being traded publicly.  The stock posted modest capital gains and a very 
healthy dividend on a yearly basis, but investors had to be willing to accept a higher level of risk.  
However, if one’s portfolio is properly diversified, a lot of this risk could be mitigated.  Boston 
Celtics’ stock provides additional diversification benefits due to its low correlation coefficient.   
 
b. Cleveland Indians Baseball Company 
Although the Cleveland Indians’ stock was only publicly traded for a short length of 
time, it performed very well over that period.  From June 30, 1998 to January 1, 2000, the 
company’s stock, traded under the ticker symbol CLEV, increased 107.56% (Table 2.0).  A buy-
and-hold strategy over this two year period would have resulted in impressive capital gains for 
shareholders.  The average annual return in this case was 46.18% with a standard deviation of 
35%.  Over the same period, the S&P 500 had an average annual return of 12.22% and a 
standard deviation of 7.03%.  This shows that that the Cleveland Indians’ stock was providing 
much higher returns, but investors were required to carry much more risk in order to achieve 
these gains.  The results of the Sharpe ratio show that the amount of risk one was required to 
carry was not excessive in regards to its returns.  The Cleveland Indians’ Sharpe ratio was 1.13 
18 
 
and the S&P 500’s was 0.79; meaning that the risk adjusted return for the Cleveland Indians’ 
was greater than that of the index.   
Another benefit of owning this stock would be its fairly low correlation to the S&P 500 
index of 0.2.  This shows that the Cleveland Indians’ stock generally did not move in the same 
direction or to the same extent as movements in the S&P 500.  This fact contributes the benefit 
of diversification to this stock when it is used in a portfolio of other assets. 
Cleveland Indians’ stock, in the short time it was publicly traded, showed some potential 
as an investment.  There was a definite opportunity to realize extraordinary capital gains while 
holding a reasonable level of risk and ability to diversify one’s portfolio by utilizing this asset in 
a portfolio. 
 
c. Florida Panthers Holdings Incorporated 
The Florida Panthers became a publicly traded company on November 31, 1996 under 
the ticker symbol PUCK.  They remained a publicly traded team until August 31, 1999 when 
they became just a minor fraction of the much larger Boca Resorts Incorporated, traded under the 
ticker symbol RST.  This paper will just focus on the performance Florida Panthers’ stock when 
it was a stand-alone stock market team.  Over this period of time, from late November 1996 to 
late August 1999, Florida Panthers Stock had an average annual return of 12.14% and a standard 
deviation of 67.42% (Table 3.0).  The Florida Panthers’ average annual return is lacking when 
compared to the 20.76% average annual return of the S&P 500 over the same period.  Although 
the stock returned 12.14%, it actually decreased in value, from November 31, 1996 to August 31, 
1999, going from $10 to $9.94.    The reason that the company still had a positive average annual 
return over the period is because it performed very well in its first year, increasing 88%.  During 
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that first year, the stock actually reached a high of $32.13 per share (on January 31, 1997) which 
would have equated to over a 221% increase from its original IPO price.  This shows that 
investors had the opportunity to realize incredible capital gains in a very short period of time if 
they bought into the stock as an IPO and sold off their shares after just a few months.   
A regression analysis of Florida Panthers’ stock compared to the S&P 500 showed much 
the same results seen in the Boston Celtics’ stock.  Such a regression shows that the Florida 
Panthers had a beta of .24, which is very low and would indicate that the stock is very stable and 
safe.  However, the r squared value associated with this beta is an extremely low 0.5%, meaning 
that the beta given by the regression does not hold much weight and is of little real value to an 
investor.   
In addition to having an average annual return that was below that of the S&P 500, the 
Florida Panthers’ stock underperformed the index in regards to risk adjusted return.  The Florida 
Panthers’ stock had a Sharpe ratio of 0.11 while the S&P 500 posted a mark of 1.39.  This shows 
that the Florida Panthers’ stock did not perform well, given its level of risk, compared to the 
S&P 500.  The reason for the large disparity between the two values is the high standard 
deviation associated with the Florida Panthers (67.42%) as compared to the S&P 500 (11.58%).   
Most of the value associated with owning Florida Panthers’ stock as an investment would 
exist in the form of diversification.  Although it is a short time frame to look at, Florida Panthers’ 
stock had a correlation coefficient of 0.07 as compared to the S&P 500 index.  This shows a very 
low relationship between the two and an opportunity to use this stock as a diversification tool.   
As a whole, Florida Panthers’ stock did not constitute a valuable investment while it was 
being publicly traded.  The stock underperformed the S&P 500 in terms of average annual return 
and, at the same time, was a riskier asset as measured by standard deviation.  As mentioned 
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earlier, the only real value in this stock would be its diversification benefits as measured by its 
low correlation coefficient.   
 
d. Manchester United PLC 
Manchester United is one of the most popular and successful soccer teams in the world.  
Their successes include 18 titles in the UK’s Premier League and 11 in the FA Cup.  The team 
was founded in 1887 and currently plays its home matches at Old Trafford stadium.  Revenues 
are generated through ticket sales, concessions, broadcasting rights, and merchandise.  Since 
2003, the team has been operated under the American owner Malcolm Glazer.  In 2005 Glazer 
ended Manchester United’s long standing as a publicly traded company and took the team 
private.   
This paper will analyze the performance on Manchester United’s stock, traded on the 
London exchange under the ticker symbol MNU, from January 1, 1997 to June 21, 2005.  Over 
this period of time, Manchester United PLC stock lost 54.2% of its value, dropping from 6.55 to 
3.00 British pound sterling (Table 4.0).  Although the stock dropped in value as a whole, it 
resulted in an average annual return of 9.46% in its domestic currency and a standard deviation 
of 65.11%.  A very small portion of this return is attributed to annual dividends paid out by the 
company.  When currency exchange rates are taken into account for an American investor, in 
total, the stock had an average annual return of 9.46% and a standard deviation of 65.11%.  This 
shows that, in general over these nine years, the currency exchange rate worked in favor of the 
USD and strengthened the asset’s returns.  When compared to the FTSE 100, a stock market 
index of 100 well-established companies listed on the London exchange, Manchester United’s 
stock performed quite well.  Over this same period of time, the FTSE 100 had an average annual 
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return of 3.54% and a standard deviation of 18.38%.  Although Manchester United’s stock 
realized larger returns than the major stock index, it was also much riskier.  This is shown by the 
large disparity in the standard deviation of the two.  Manchester United’s standard deviation is 
very high, thus showing that the stock has large fluctuations and has high price volatility.   
 When compared to the movement in the FTSE 100, Manchester United’s stock shows 
very little correlation.  The correlation coefficient related to these two variables was -0.03.  This 
negative coefficient shows that in general, the stock moved slightly in the opposite direction of 
the market index.  This is incredibly beneficial in diversifying one’s portfolio of assets.  By 
including an asset that moves opposite the market, one can lessen the losses associated with a 
downturn in the overall market.   
 This analysis shows that there was, in fact, some value in owning Manchester United’s 
stock over this nine year period.  It provided an investor the opportunity to achieve average 
yearly returns that outpaced the market; however, such an investor would have to be willing to 
accept a much higher level of risk on a standalone basis.  The main benefit of this stock lies in its 
negative correlation to the major stock index and ability to help an investor diversify their 
portfolio of assets. 
  
e. Aston Villa PLC 
Aston Villa PLC is an English soccer team that competes in the UK’s Premier league.  
Formed in 1874, Aston Villa has won 5 league championships and 7 FA cups.  They play their 
home matches at Villa Park in Birmingham and have been owned by American, Randy Lerner, 
who bought and took the team private in 2006.   
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In the past, Aston villa PLC has had stock traded on the London exchange under the ticker 
symbol ASV.  From October 6, 1997 to October 16, 2006, Aston villa PLC had an average 
annual return of 5.03% and a standard deviation of 45.04% over the period in its domestic 
currency (Table 5.0).  Although the stock had a positive average annual return, over the entire 
ten years it lost 35.85% of its value dropping from 8.48 to 5.44 British sterling pounds.  A very 
small portion of the stock’s annual return comes from a small dividend that was paid out in 1998 
to 2002.  When the total return in GBP is combined with the currency yield to USD over the ten 
year period, it would have lowered the returns to an American investor.  The average annual 
return after this conversion would have dropped to 4.21% with a lower standard deviation of 
40.83%.  Although the standard deviation dropped about five percent when converting the prices 
to US dollars, this is still a very large value and shows the price volatility of the stock.  When 
compared to the FTSE 100, which had an average annual return of 3.81% and a standard 
deviation of 16.49%, ASV’s stock yielded a higher return but contained more price volatility 
than the index. 
The correlation coefficient associated with Aston Villa’s stock and the FTSE 100 is  -0.07.  
Because the stock had a very low negative correlation to the major index and even had some 
tendency to move in the opposite direction, this stock had valuable diversification benefits.  
It should be noted that up until 2003, Aston Villa PLC had negative returns every year dating 
back to 1997; but from 2003 onward, each year resulted in positive annual returns.  Such a 
turnaround may be based on an announcement of privatization of the team.  When teams 
transition from being public to private companies, shareholders are often paid a premium for 
their stake in the company.  This means that the shares are usually bought back at a price above 
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their normal market value.  Knowing this, investors want to own the shares when the transition is 
made in hopes that they can realize significant capital gains in a short period of time.   
As a whole, Aston Villa PLC was not a profitable investment.  It had very volatile average 
annual returns that barely outpaced the market.  There is the opportunity, however, to use this 
stock to help diversify an investor’s portfolio due to its slightly negative correlation to the major 
market index.  In addition, price appreciation was a possibility for an investor who purchased the 
stock in 2003 as the company was approaching privatization.   
  
VI. Select Current Publicly Traded Teams 
Even with all the privatization of soccer clubs, there are still several that maintain their 
public ownership, including Juventus, Roma, Tottenham, and Watford (Nauright and Ramfjord, 
2010). 
 
a. Juventus F.C. S.p.A 
Juventus F.C, founded in 1897, is one of the most popular and successful soccer clubs in 
Italy’s National Professional League.  Since 1923 the team has been controlled by the Agnelli 
family, which started and continues to own 30% of automaker Fiat.  They have won two 
Champions League titles, three UEFA Cups, and a record 27 Serie A league championships.  
Even with all of this success, Juventus F.C. has faced some adversity.  In 2007 the team was 
relegated to a lower level of competition, Serie B, after being investigated in a match fixing 
scandal.  It was found that team executives colluded with league officials to appoint preferential 
referees for Juventus’ games.  In addition to this, the investigation uncovered some accounting 
irregularities that lead to the resignation of the company’s entire board of directors. (Hoovers) 
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Juventus F.C. S.p.A has common stock traded on the Milan exchange under the ticker 
symbol JUVE.MI.  According to Reuters.com, as of April 21,2011, Juventus’ stock was being 
traded at .82 euro a share with 201.55 million shares outstanding and a market capitalization of 
167.29 euro (Table 6.0).  According to Reuters.com, Juventus has a beta of .75, which is a 
measure to indicate the amount of variability in the company’s stock return compared to the 
market. The market has a beta of 1.0, meaning that Juventus’ stock price is more stable than 
average; however, it is more volatile than the industry average beta of .71.  Over the past nine 
years, from January 1, 2002 to January 3, 2011, Juventus’ average yearly return on its stock has 
been -7.54% with a standard deviation of 30.87%.  In total, over the past nine years, Juventus 
stock has dropped 74.93% from 3.47 euro to .87 euro per share (Table 7.0). 
The company’s growth rates do not show any more promise than their recent stock 
returns.  Their sales in the first quarter of 2010, as compared to the first quarter from the year 
before, have dropped by 33.44%.  Also, their 2010 sales as a whole have dropped 19.52% from 
2009, resulting in a five year growth rate in sales of just .88% (Table 8.0). 
Earnings per share, which measures the amount of profit for every individual share 
outstanding, has dropped an incredible 1,145.58% from the year end 2009 to the year end 2010.  
It also appears that Juvenutus may have a difficult time meeting its short term debt obligations 
with its current assets.  This is shown by their current ratio of .35, meaning that they have $0.35 
of current assets for every $1 of current liabilities on their balance sheet.  In addition, Juventus 
has a debt-to-equity ratio of 85.71, which is outrageous compared to the industry average of 
29.51. 
In 2010, Juventus F.C.’s profitability was very poor.  They had an operating margin of -
29.6% and a five year average of -3.12%.  Furthermore, their 2010 net profit margin was -
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33.29% resulting in a five year average of -6.57%.  These ratios show that Juventus is unable to 
turn any of their revenues into profits.  As of 2010, Juventus had a return on assets (ROA) of       
-21.44 and a five year average ROA of -5.29 percent.  Return on investment (ROI) was -37.27 
with a five year average of -9.48 percent.  Finally, they had a return on equity (ROE) of -91.48 
with a five year average of -17.51 percent.  These three measures (ROA, ROI, and ROE) are 
commonly used to measure the effectiveness of management to use assets, equity, and other 
investments to generate profits for the company.  Not only were they unable to generate profits 
in 201, but the negative five year averages show that it is a trend for the company is the recent 
past. 
Juventus F.C. would not constitute a valuable investment opportunity.  They have poor 
sales growth, habitual losses, and a large amount of debt in their capital structure.  Something 
significant in the company needs to change before Juventus should be looked at as an 
investment.  
 
b. A.S. Roma S.p.A 
Founded in 1927, A.S. Roma is a professional soccer club that, like Juventus F.C., 
competes in Italy’s National Professional League Serie A.  The club has been owned and 
controlled by Italy’s Sensi family since 1993, but has recently put its 67% ownership of the team 
up for sale in 2010.  Roma has been fairly successful throughout its existence, winning three 
Serie A championships and nine Italian Cups.  The team competes in a very large, 72,700 seat, 
Olympic Stadium in Rome.   
A.S. Roma has stock that is traded on the Milan exchange under the ticker symbol 
ASR.MI.  As of April 21, 2011, Roma’s stock was being traded at 0.75 euro per share, had a beta 
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of 1.25, 132.52 million shares outstanding, and a market capitalization of 97.07 million euro 
(Table 6.0).  In the past nine years, Roma’s stock has lost 56.16% of its value and had an average 
annual return of -1.24% with a standard deviation of 34.46%.  However, over the past five years 
the stock has performed well.  Over this period, investors have seen a 98.36% increase in the 
stock’s price with an average annual return of 20.29% and a standard deviation of 16.94% (Table 
9.0).   
Sales for A.S. Roma have surged of late, increasing 9.04% compared to the industry 
average of 5.53% in regards to the first quarter of 2010 versus the first quarter of 2009 (Table 
8.0).  This seems to be a recent trend, however, because Roma’s five year sales growth rate is a 
minuscule 0.78% compared to the industry average of 11.13% over that same period.  Although 
sales seem to be increasing for the company, they have been unable to turn them into profits.  
Their operating margin in 2010 was -22.33%; far behind the industry average of 12.36%.  On 
average, over the past five years, the company has been able to turn a positive operating margin 
of 3.33%; however, it still lags well behind the industry average of 12.25% over the same period.  
Net profit margin is a similar situation, strongly negative in 2010 (-22.85%) and on average very 
low over the past five years (.85%).   
Compared to the industry averages, Roma is less liquid than most.  Liquidity refers to a 
company’s ability to convert its assets to cash and pay its short term liabilities in a timely 
manner.  In 2010 Roma had a quick ratio of 0.51 and a current ratio of 0.53, which were far less 
than the industry averages of 1.19 and 1.45 respectively.  This shows that, in the short term, 
Roma has less short-term capital on hand to fund its day-to-day operations and may have a 
difficult time paying off their short term debt obligations.   
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In 2010, the company’s management was ineffective in using its assets and investments 
to make any sort of return for the company.  ROA was -23.85 % and ROI was -184.42%; 
obviously disappointing when compared to the industry averages of 0.72% and 1.04% 
respectively.  Over the past five years; however, they have seen some positive, yet small, 
improvements in these ratios.  On average over this period the company has had .89% ROA, 
5.22% ROI, and 40.58% ROE.  All of these ratios still lag behind the industry average except 
ROE, which is much greater than the industry average of 13.65%. 
Although Roma has seen very healthy stock returns in the past five years, its high beta 
and inability to turn increasing sales into profits is a concern.  This ineffective nature of 
management may change however; with the announcement that 67% and control of the team will 
be purchased by a newly constituted company led by United States businessman Thomas Di 
Benedetto (Keiper, 2011).  Benedetto is familiar to sports ownership, having been a partner of 
New England Sports Ventures which owns the Boston Red Sox Major League Baseball team and 
English Premier League side Liverpool.  Talks of this takeover have been going on for some 
time and may account for the recent surge in Roma’s stock price.  Now, as required by Italian 
law, the new ownership will have to make a public offer to purchase the remaining 33% of 
shares outstanding.  This means that there could be an opportunity to realize capital gains in the 
short term if shares are purchased at a healthy premium. 
 
c. Tottenham Hotspur PLC 
Tottenham Hotspur F.C., founded in 1882, is one of the UK’s Premier League’s best 
teams.  The majority owner of Tottenham F.C. is ENIC International, an investment vehicle 
controlled by billionaire Joe Lewis, which owns about 85% of the team.  The Hotspur’s 
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successes include two Premier league titles and eight FA Cups, with its last coming in 1991.  The 
team currently competes at White Hart Lane in London with a capacity of 36,310; however, in 
2009 they announced plans to build a 56,000 seat stadium in London.  This new stadium includes 
plans to create a hotel, residential housing, and retail space as well (Hoovers).    
Tottenham Hotspur PLC has common stock that is traded on the London exchange under 
the ticker symbol TTNM.L.  As of April 21, 2011, their stock was being traded at 62 pounds per 
share, had a beta of .53, with 213.86 million shares outstanding, and a market capitalization of 
128.32 million pounds (Table 6.0).  The stock also had a PE ratio of 20.6, according to 
Reuters.com, which means that an investor would have to pay $20.60 for every $1 in earning per 
share that the company generates.  When compared to the industry average of 17.06, it is shown 
that Tottenham’s stock is a little more expensive relative to its industry.   
Over the past eight years, from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2011, Tottenham’s stock 
has had an average annual return of 30.39% and a standard deviation of 88% (Table 10.0).  In 
total, the stock has risen 225% and 176.83% over the past eight and five years respectively.  
These abnormally high returns are partly skewed, however, by a 247% increase in the stock price 
from January 1, 2008 to January 2, 2009.  
Over the past five years, Tottenham’s sales have grown 11.17%, which is nearly identical 
to the industry average of 11.13% (Table 8.0).  In 2010, and over the past five years, Tottenham 
has been able to translate this sales growth into profits.  This can be seen by their operating 
margins and net profit margins in 2010 and over the past five years.  Their operating margin in 
2010 was well behind the industry average of 12.36, but was still positive at 4.71%.  This is 
similar to the average operating margin over the past five years but at a much smaller margin, 
with the industry at 12.25% and Tottenham at 11.87%.  Net profit margin (NPM) is much the 
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same; Tottenham had a NPM of 2.54% in 2010 and a five year average of 6.68%, while the 
industry’s average NPM was 8.97% in 2010 and 7.8% over the past five years.  This has 
translated into increases in earnings per share for 2010 of 97.16% compared to 2009. 
Although sales and earnings are growing, the company is still not financially strong.  For 
example, Tottenham’s quick ratio of .3 and current ratio of 0.32 are lacking compared to the 
industry averages of 1.19 and 1.45 respectively.  Furthermore, Tottenham is carrying a lot of 
debt in its capital structure, as seen by its long term debt-to-equity ratio of 62.51; which far 
exceeds the industry average of 29.51.  This may indicate that Tottenham may have trouble 
meeting both their short-term and long-term debt obligations at some point in time.   
The effectiveness of company management, in terms of ROA, ROI, and ROE seem to be 
improving.  Over the past five years Tottenham’s ROA and ROI have trailed industry averages.  
However, ROA, ROI, and ROE all outpaced the industry averages in 2010.  This shows that the 
management has learned how to better gain profitability for the company in relation to the same 
amount of assets, equity, and other investments.   
Of all the publicly traded European football clubs listed in this paper, Tottenham appears 
to be the best investment opportunity.  The stock has shown tremendous growth historically, yet 
is very safe with a beta of 0.53.  They have shown the ability to turn profits from their increasing 
sales which translates into improving returns for shareholders. 
 
d. Watford Leisure PLC 
The Watford Football Club was founded in 1881 as the Watford Rovers, but has since 
changed their name to the Hornets.  The team made its first appearance in England’s Premier 
League in 2000 and currently competes in the Champions League.  The team is sponsored by the 
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British loan company, Loans.co.uk, and plays at Vicarage Road Stadium which seats 22,000 
(Hoovers).    
Watford Leisure PLC has common stock traded on the London exchange under the ticker 
symbol WFC.L.  As of April 21, 2011, according to Reuters.com, their stock was being traded at 
2.0 pounds per share, with 43.89 million shares outstanding, a market capitalization of 0.88 
million pounds, and a beta of 0.4 (Table 6.0).  Over the past seven years, from April 1, 2004 to 
April 1, 20011, Watford has seen an average annual stock return of -31.98% and a standard 
deviation of 35.56% (Table 11.0).  In total, over the past seven years, their stock price has lost 
98.28 percent of its value, dropping from 65 pounds to 1.12 pounds.   
Watford’s sales have not shown much promise either.  In the past five years, Watford’s 
sales have grown a mere 5.71%; very small compared to the industry average of 11.13% (Table 
8.0).  In effect, Watford has struggled to be profitable in 2010 across the board.  Their operating 
margin over the past five years has averages -0.97%, including -49.3% in 2010.  Net profit 
margin shows a similar story.  Watford’s NPM of -55.46% is terrible compared to the industry 
average of 8.97%.  Moreover, they have had an average NPM of -3.42% over the past five years 
while the industry has averaged 7.8% over that same period.  This poor profitability is magnified 
even more by the company’s ROA, ROI, and ROE which are -35.54, -187.76, and -768.58 
respectively.  Not only are these values negative in 2010, but each of these three ratios, on 
average, have been negative over the past five years.  This has caused their earnings per share to 
take a huge hit in 2010 by dropping 4,944% from 2009. 
The company’s liquidity ratios are quite grim.  They have a quick ratio of 0.12 while the 
industry average is 1.19.  Likewise, they have a current ratio of 0.12 while the industry average 
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is 1.45.  This shows that Watford carries excessive short term liabilities on their balance sheet in 
comparison to their short term assets. 
In sum, Watford Leisure PLC has a historically poor stock performance, shrinking sales 
growth and profit ability, and is relatively illiquid.  For these reasons WFC.L is not a viable 
investment right now or in the near future.  The only possibility to make a profit off of this stock 
seems to be if Watford follows the trend of privatization in Europe and the shares are bought 
back from investors at a premium. 
  As a whole, these publicly traded European sports teams do not show much value as 
financial investments.  Most of them show poor growth and ability to turn profits consistently.  
The profit potential of such teams lies in the event of privatization.  If these companies, like 
many others before them, transition to private ownership then there is a chance that their shares 
will be purchased back at a higher price than their market value.  In this event, shareholders 
could possibly realize significant capital gains.  However, holding such stock in anticipation of 
such an event could take many years and be very costly, in terms of carrying costs, to an 
investor. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) have been carried out in a variety of ways by a number of teams 
that compete in different sports leagues all over the world.  IPO’s give owners the opportunity to 
raise large amounts of capital to fund various operations having to do with the team or the 
company in general. This capital can be used towards renovating or building a new stadium, 
paying new players, or helping owners liquidate some of their investment.  Issuing an IPO can 
have downsides such as opposition from other owners and the league itself, increased costs of 
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operating the business, and an increased level of disclosure about their operations.  An owner 
must weigh the positives and negatives of such a move in order to determine whether or not a 
move to public ownership would be beneficial for their team/company.  Many individuals that 
take part in an IPO by a sports team are fans that simply want the opportunity to own a part of 
their favorite team.  There is a sense of pride that fans receive from owning a portion of a team 
that means so much to them as a person.  On the flip side, when owners have initiated IPOs, they 
have often stated that they have no intent of paying dividends or making extraordinary efforts to 
increase shareholder’s returns.  An analysis of publicly traded professional sports team’s stock 
shows that there can be some opportunities to realize significant capital gains, however, these 
stocks are very volatile and risky investments.  The majority of these capital gains can be made 
when there is announcement that the company will be buying out shareholders and making a 
move to privatize.  The main benefit of owning such a stock is in the diversification benefits that 
it can give investors when the stock is placed in a portfolio of assets.  These stocks tend to have 
very low correlation to the market and, in some cases, have a tendency to move in the opposite 
direction.  Therefore, investors looking for a high-risk, high-return stock with high benefits of 
diversification could look to stock in publicly traded professional sports teams.  In future public 
offerings, investors seeking benefits other than that of pride and emotional well-being should pay 
close attention to ownership structure and the possibility of the company eventually being taken 
private.  This is where most of the value lies for publicly traded professional sports teams. 
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Table 1.0.  Boston Celtics Limited Partnership Stock Returns 
       Boston Celtics' (BOS) Stock from Year End 1986 to April 30, 2003 
       
Year Divided/year 
Shares 
Out. Price 
Capital 
Gain 
Total Yearly 
Return 
S&P 500 Yearly 
Returns 
12/31/1986   6435 $15.75       
12/31/1987 $1.60 6435 $11.50 -26.98% -16.83% 6.15% 
12/30/1988 $1.60 6435 $13.75 19.57% 33.48% 15.72% 
12/29/1989 $1.05 6435 $18.13 31.82% 39.45% 10.63% 
12/31/1990 $2.40 6435 $17.88 -1.38% 11.86% 4.51% 
12/31/1991 $2.25 6435 $20.00 11.89% 24.48% 18.86% 
12/31/1992 $1.25 6435 $17.00 -15.00% -8.75% 7.34% 
12/31/1993 $1.25 6400 $19.00 11.76% 19.12% 9.76% 
12/30/1994 $1.50 6400 $21.75 14.47% 22.37% -2.32% 
12/29/1995 $1.50 5641 $23.13 6.32% 13.22% 35.20% 
12/31/1996 $2.50 5876 $22.38 -3.24% 7.57% 23.61% 
12/31/1997 $1.00 5346 $20.19 -9.78% -5.31% 24.69% 
12/31/1998 $1.00 2704 $10.31 -48.92% -43.96% 30.54% 
12/31/1999 $0.00 2704 $10.00 -3.03% -3.03% 8.97% 
12/29/2000 $0.00 2704 $7.75 -22.50% -22.50% -2.04% 
12/31/2001 $0.00 2704 $11.00 41.94% 41.94% -17.26% 
12/31/2002 $0.00 2704 $27.50 150.00% 150.00% -19.57% 
4/30/2003 $27.00         
 
       Year 10 yr T-Note 
     2002 5.04% 
     
       BOS 
   
S&P 500 
  Mean 16.44% 
  
Mean 9.67% 
 St Dev 42.65% 
  
St. Dev 15.35% 
 
       
R Square 0.0062 
  
Sharpe 
Ratio 0.3018 
 Coefficients 0.1483 
     
       Correlation 0.0786 
     
       Sharpe 
Ratio 0.2674 
     
 
 
Table 2.0.  Cleveland Indians Baseball Company Stock Returns 
     Cleveland Indians' (CLEV) Stock Information 
     
Date 
Shares 
Out. Price 
Yearly 
Return 
S&P 500 Yearly 
Return 
6/30/1998 4139 $10.75     
6/30/1999 4139 $18.38 70.93% 17.19% 
1/31/2000 4139 $22.31 21.43% 7.24% 
     
Year 
10 yr T-
Note 
   2000 6.66% 
   
     CLEV 
  
S&P 500 
 Mean 46.18% 
 
Mean 12.22% 
St. Dev 35.00% 
 
St. Dev 7.03% 
     
R Square 0.0396 
 
Sharpe 
Ratio 0.7901 
Coefficient 0.9559 
   
     Correlation 0.1990 
   
     Sharpe 
Ratio 1.1290 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.0.  Florida Panthers Holding Company Stock Returns 
     Fl. Panthers Holding Company's (PUCK & PAW) Stock 
     
Date 
Shares 
Out. Price 
Yearly 
Return 
S&P 500 Yearly 
Returns 
11/29/1996 23393 $10.00     
11/28/1997 31685 $18.81 88.13% 28.19% 
11/30/1998 34890 $11.19 -40.53% 26.67% 
8/31/1999 40551 $9.94 -11.17% 7.42% 
     
Year 
10 yr T-
Note 
   1999 4.72% 
   
     PUCK & 
PAW 
  
S&P 500 
 Mean 12.14% 
 
Mean 20.76% 
St. Dev 67.42% 
 
St. Dev 11.58% 
     
R Square 0.0052 
 
Sharpe 
Ratio 1.3852 
Coefficient 0.2357 
   
     Correlation 0.0718 
   
     Sharpe 
Ratio 0.1101 
    
 
 
Table 4.0.  Manchester United PLC Stock Returns 
          Manchester United PLC's (MNU) Stock Information 
          
Date 
Shares 
Out Div (GBP) 
Div 
Growth 
Price 
(GBP) 
Cap Gain 
(Loss) 
Total Ret 
(GBP) 
Currency 
Yield 
Total Ret 
(USD) 
FTSE 
Yearly Ret 
1/2/1997 64942010     £6.55           
1997 259600000 0.0776   £1.59 -75.80% -74.62% -3.66% -78.28% 27.66% 
1998 259800000 0.0213 -72.55% £2.23 40.69% 42.04% -4.75% 37.29% 8.02% 
1999 259800000 0.02 -6.10% £2.03 -9.08% -8.18% -2.40% -10.58% 6.32% 
2000 259800000 0.0211 5.50% £2.30 13.44% 14.48% 4.27% 18.75% 0.46% 
2001 259800000 0.0222 5.21% £1.42 -38.26% -37.30% 9.56% -27.74% -17.99% 
2002 259800000 0.0344 54.95% £1.04 -26.76% -24.34% 5.16% -19.18% -30.93% 
2003 261068040 0.0444 29.07% £2.64 153.85% 158.12% -3.38% 154.74% 23.08% 
2004 263328732 0.0295 -33.56% £2.75 4.17% 5.28% -13.82% -8.54% 10.51% 
6/21/2005 265192483 0.0147 -50.17% £3.00 9.09% 9.63% 3.42% 13.05% 4.74% 
                              
          Man. United 
  
FTSE 100 
      Mean (GBP) 8.83% 
 
Mean 3.54% 
     St. Dev 63.84% 
 
St. Dev 18.38% 
     
          Mean (USD) 9.46% 
        St. Dev 65.11% 
        
          R Square 0.0007 
        Coefficient -0.0769 
        
          Correlation -0.0268 
         
 
 
Table 5.0.  Aston Villa PLC Stock Returns 
         Aston Villa PLC's (ASV) Stock Information 
         
Date 
Shares 
Out. Div (GBP) 
Price 
(GBP) 
Cap. 
Gain 
(Loss) 
Total Ret. 
(GBP) 
Currency 
Yield 
Total Ret. 
(USD) 
FTSE 100 Yearly 
Ret 
10/6/1997 11449245   £8.48           
1997 11449245   £7.13 -15.93% -15.93% -3.66% -19.59% 12.73% 
1998 11449245 0.11 £6.85 -3.86% -2.32% -4.75% -7.07% 8.02% 
1999 11449245 0.0977 £4.30 -37.23% -35.80% -2.40% -38.20% 6.32% 
2000 11449245 0.0977 £2.68 -37.79% -35.52% 4.27% -31.25% 0.46% 
2001 11449245 0.0977 £1.60 -40.37% -36.72% 9.56% -27.16% -17.99% 
2002 11449245 0.0855 £1.23 -23.20% -17.84% 5.16% -12.68% -30.93% 
2003 11449245   £1.73 41.22% 41.22% -3.38% 37.84% 23.08% 
2004 11449245   £3.55 104.91% 104.91% -13.82% 91.09% 10.51% 
2005 11449245   £4.73 33.29% 33.29% 6.77% 40.06% 18.71% 
10/16/2006 11449245   £5.44 15.03% 15.03% -5.99% 9.03% 7.15% 
         
                  Aston Villa 
  
FTSE 100 
     Mean (GBP) 5.03% 
 
Mean 3.81% 
    St. Dev 45.04% 
 
St. Dev 16.49% 
    
         Mean (USD) 4.21% 
       St. Dev 40.83% 
       
         R Square 0.0049 
       Coefficient -0.1776 
       
         Correlation -0.0696 
       
 
 
Table 6.0.  Overview of Select Publicly Traded European Professional Sports Teams 
as of April 21, 2011 
         
Company Ticker 
52 Wk 
High 
52 Wk 
Low Close 
Avg. 
Volume Beta 
Shares Outstanding 
(Mil) 
Market Cap 
(Mil) 
Juventus F.C. S.p.A JUVE.MI € 1.00 € 0.73 € 0.82 115,560 0.76 201.55 € 167.29 
A.S. Roma S.p.A. ASR.MI € 1.29 € 0.67 € 0.75 2,479,344 1.25 132.52 € 97.07 
Tottenham Hotspur 
PLC  TTNM.L £77.00 £58.00 £62.00 9,059 0.53 213.86 £128.32 
Watford Leisure PLC WFC.L £11.25 £1.10 £2.00 58,729 0.40 43.89 £0.88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.0.  Juventus F.C. SpA Stock 
Returns  
   Juventus F.C. SpA (JUVE.MI) 
Date Adj Close Returns 
12/20/2001 3.53   
1/1/2002 3.47 -1.70% 
1/1/2003 1.5 -56.77% 
1/1/2004 1.71 14.00% 
1/3/2005 1.39 -18.71% 
1/2/2006 1.33 -4.32% 
1/2/2007 1.94 45.86% 
1/2/2008 0.86 -55.67% 
1/2/2009 0.8 -6.98% 
1/4/2010 0.88 10.00% 
1/3/2011 0.87 -1.14% 
   Percent change (9 yrs) -74.93% 
Percent change (5 yrs) -55.15% 
   Mean -7.54% 
 St. Dev 30.87% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.0.  Financials of Currently Traded Professional Sports Teams 
as of April 21, 2011 
        
 
  Roma Tottenham Watford Juventus Industry S&P 500 
Valuation P/E Ratio (TTM) -- 20.6 -- -- 17.06 17.93 
 
P/E High - Last 5 
Yrs. 
5.88 128.05 21.63 24.91 45.57 94.17 
 
P/E Low - Last 5 
Yrs. 
5.54 6.51 1.24 24.91 23.84 12.35 
 
Beta 1.27 0.53 0.4 0.75 0.71 1.29 
 
  
Growth 
Sales (MRQ) vs 
Qtr. 1 Yr. Ago 
9.04 49.04 5.31 -33.44 5.53 8.05 
 
Sales (TTM) vs 
TTM 1 Yr. Ago 
1.12 30.83 -33.16 -19.52 2.92 10.66 
 
Sales - 5 Yr. 
Growth Rate 
0.78 11.17 5.71 0.88 11.13 7.52 
 
EPS (MRQ) vs 
Qtr. 1 Yr. Ago 
-66.12 102.5 -1,360.05 -344.31 1,305.07 59.5 
 
EPS (TTM) vs 
TTM 1 Yr. Ago 
-138.23 97.16 -4,994.08 -1,145.58 -- -- 
 
  
Fin. Strength 
Quick Ratio 
(MRQ) 
0.51 0.3 0.12 -- 1.19 0.65 
 
Current Ratio 
(MRQ) 
0.53 0.32 0.12 0.35 1.45 0.98 
 
LT Debt to Equity 
(MRQ) 
-- 62.51 -- 85.71 29.51 105.39 
 
Total Debt to 
Equity (MRQ) 
-- 103.51 -- 123.5 38.82 149.59 
 
Interest Coverage 
(TTM) 
--       0.65 17.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.0.  Financials of Currently Traded Professional Sports Teams 
as of April 21, 2011 
(Continued) 
 
  
Profitability 
Gross Margin (TTM) 85.09 -- -17.41 5.27 4.62 32.38 
 
Gross Margin - 5 Yr. 
Avg. 
88.04 95.25 3.05 62.66 62.9 30.28 
 
EBITD Margin (TTM) -5.89 34.12 -33.69 11.87 -- -- 
 
EBITD - 5 Yr. Avg 17.5 41.71 16.29 14.19 18.28 19.24 
 
Operating Margin 
(TTM) 
-22.33 4.71 -49.3 -29.6 12.36 -- 
 
Operating Margin - 5 
Yr. Avg. 
3.33 11.87 -0.97 -3.12 12.25 14.74 
 
Net Profit Margin 
(TTM) 
-22.85 2.54 -55.46 -33.29 8.97 11.42 
 
Net Profit Margin - 5 Yr. 
Avg. 
0.85 6.68 -3.42 -6.57 7.8 10.58 
 
Receivable Turnover 
(TTM) 
1.19       86.6 8.87 
 
Inventory Turnover 
(TTM) 
2.51       12.32 7.55 
 
Asset Turnover (TTM) 1.04       0.13 0.55 
 
  
Management 
Return on Assets (TTM) -23.85 1.28 -35.54 -21.44 0.72 5.96 
 
Return on Assets - 5 Yr. 
Avg. 
0.89 3.44 -3.2 -5.29 5.87 5.73 
 
Return on Investment 
(TTM) 
-184.42 2.14 -187.76 -37.27 1.04 7.61 
 
Return on Investment - 5 
Yr. Avg. 
5.22 5.8 -10.95 -9.48 9.62 7.49 
 
Return on Equity (TTM) -- 4.76 -768.58 -91.48 1.8 17.4 
 
Return on Equity - 5 Yr. 
Avg. 
40.58 14.68 -24.44 -17.51 13.65 14.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.0. A.S. Roma Stock 
Returns 
   A.S. Roma SpA (ASR.MI) 
Date 
Price 
(euros) Returns 
12/24/2001 2.91   
1/1/2002 2.76 -5.15% 
1/1/2003 1.15 -58.33% 
1/1/2004 1.39 20.87% 
1/3/2005 0.57 -58.99% 
1/2/2006 0.5 -12.28% 
1/2/2007 0.61 22.00% 
1/2/2008 0.6 -1.64% 
1/2/2009 0.67 11.67% 
1/4/2010 0.84 25.37% 
1/3/2011 1.21 44.05% 
   % change (9 
year)   -56.16% 
% change (5 
year)   98.36% 
   Mean (9 yr) -1.24% 
 St Dev 34.46% 
 
   Mean (5 yr) 20.29% 
 St Dev 16.94% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10.0.  Tottenham Hotspur PLC Stock 
Returns 
   Tottenham Hotspur PLC (TTNM.L) 
Date 
Price 
(GBP) Yearly Returns 
1/1/2003 20   
1/1/2004 23.48 17.40% 
1/3/2005 23.48 0.00% 
1/2/2006 23.48 0.00% 
1/1/2007 23.48 0.00% 
1/1/2008 23.48 0.00% 
1/2/2009 81.5 247.10% 
1/4/2010 74.2 -8.96% 
1/4/2011 65 -12.40% 
   Percent change (9 
years) 225.00% 
Percent change (5 
years) 176.83% 
   Mean 30.39% 
 St. Dev 88.00% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11.0.  Watford Leisure PLC Stock 
Returns 
   Watford Leisure PLC (WFC.L) 
Date 
Price 
(GBP) Returns 
3/11/2004 80   
4/1/2004 65 -18.75% 
4/1/2005 45 -30.77% 
4/3/2006 29 -35.56% 
4/2/2007 20 -31.03% 
4/1/2008 28 40.00% 
4/1/2009 12 -57.14% 
4/1/2010 7.5 -37.50% 
4/1/2011 1.12 -85.07% 
   Percent change (7 
years)   -98.28% 
Percent change (5 
years)   -94.40% 
   Mean  -31.98% 
 St Dev 35.56% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
